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Criminal Law-RECRUITED GOVERNMENT INFORMANTS: WHEN
DOES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACH?-United States v. Henry,
100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980)
In a decision reminiscent of the Warren Court,1 the Supreme
Court in United States v. Henry2 excluded inculpatory statements
made by the indicted Billy Gale Henry to an undercover govern-
ment agent sharing his jail cell. This expansive interpretation of
the sixth amendment caught the attention of the nation's popular
press,s and reaffirmed the vitality of another sixth amendment
lodestar, Massiah v. United States.4
The purpose of this note is to place Henry in its proper histori-
cal niche-the latest chapter in the exposition of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. This historical process will trace the right to
counsel from the modest protections it afforded in the twelfth cen-
tury, through its matter of fact inclusion in the Bill of Rights, to
its full bloom under the Warren Court, and its surprising extension
in Henry.
The first section of this note will be a brief overview of sixth
amendment history describing the ever more expansive interpreta-
tion that the sixth amendment has received. Section two is a dis-
cussion of United States v. Henry, particularly as viewed within
the framework of Massiah principles. The final section asks what
effect Henry will have on police procedure.
I. NUTSHELL HISTORY OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The history of the right to counsel stretches back to 1115." A
passage from Legis Henrici Primi is cited by legal scholars for the
proposition that the right to counsel was not available in felony
cases.e Nevertheless, at least three different types of counsel were
1. See generally J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 342-43
(1979); J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 219-38 (1967). For an unusual
analysis of what made the Warren Court "activist" see D. SELVAR, LEGAL THINKING IN SIX
SELECTED CIVIL LIBERTIES DECISIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1973).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
3. TIME, June 30, 1980, at 51. Professor Kamisar notes that the Henry opinion will make
Massiah stronger than ever. Id.
4. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
5. Note, An Historical Argument For the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,
73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018 (1964). See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-62 (1932) (providing
an overview of the history of right to counsel).
6. "De causis criminalibus uel capitalibus ... nemo quaerat consilium, quin in-
placitatus statim perneget sine omni peticione consilii, ciuscumque nacionis uel condi-
cionis sit: uel eius aflirmacionem uel negacionem defensor aut dominus prosequatur com-
petenti termino comprobandum." 1 LIEBERMANN, GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN 547, 571
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available by the thirteenth century: the pleader, the attornatus,
and the advocatus.7 The pleader stood by his client's side and
spoke on his behalf. The attornatus represented his client by ap-
pearing for him and presenting his case. The advocatus appeared
not for the defendant, but for himself. He was usually the defen-
dant's lord, and acted as his surety.8 It is an irony of history that
this wealth of counsel was not available to those in greatest need:
those accused of felonies. In the twelfth century, conviction for any
felony carried a sentence of death-or worse.9
In those early days before crime and tort became settled catego-
ries, those nonfelony defendants who had the benefit of counsel
labored under the law/facts dichotomy. This meant that the defen-
dant had to present the facts to which he was presumed to have
easiest access, while his counsel applied the law to the facts.10
Though the origin of this dichotomy is uncertain, by the time of
Lord Coke it was firmly established." In 1695, an Act of Parlia-
ment extended the right to counsel to those accused of treason or
misprision of treason, and further required the appointment of
(1903) (quoted in Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018 (1964). The author of the note translated the above
phrase as follows:
In criminal or capital cases let no man seek consilium; rather let him forthwith
deny [the charge] without having pleaded [having impleaded?] [and] without any
asking for consilium, of whatever nation or state of life he may be; [then] let his
defendor or his lord follow up his afilrmance [affirmative defense] or denial by the
appropriate method of proof.
Id.
Legis Henrici is "a book written between 1114 and 1118 containing Anglo-Saxon and Nor-
man law. It is said to be an invaluable source of knowledge of the period preceding the full
developments of the Norman law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (4th ed. 1968)
The note contains a very thorough and enlightening treatment of the subject. An "Appen-
dix of Colonial Provisions on Counsel to 1800" contains a discussion of each of the thirteen
colonies' approach to this criminal procedure. Id. at 1055.
7. P. LEwis & K. PEOPLES, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS-CASES AND
COMMENTS 549 (1978).
8. Id. See also 1 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211-13 (2d ed. 1968);
Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73
YALE L.J. 1000, 1019 (1964).
9. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 452-53, 490, 500. "When punishment came it
was severe .... [There are examples] of death inflicted by hanging, beheading, burning,
drowning, stoning. ... [Other torments were the] loss of ears, nose, upper lip, hands and
feet;. .. castration and flogging. . . ." Id. at 452-53. See also M. FoUCEAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977).
10. P. LEWIS & K. PEOPLES, supra note 7, at 550.
11. Id. This was called the absolutist era of criminal procedure in England. Note, supra
note 8, at 1032.
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counsel for these cases when necessary. 2 Counsel was allowed to
aid the defendant in matters of both fact and law.
The eighteenth century saw an increase in counsel functions that
made it possible for a defendant to have the assistance of his attor-
ney during all parts of the trial except the conclusion of evidence, a
privilege reserved for the King's Counsel."3 The procedural handi-
caps deriving from the law/facts dichotomy had also disappeared.1"
At the time the sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion was proposed in 1789, every state but Rhode Island had incor-
porated some provision for right to counsel into its constitution. 5
Modern sixth amendment right to counsel cases trace their gene-
ology to Powell v. Alabama1  and Johnson v. Zerbst.17 Powell is
one of the notorious Scottsboro cases from the early 1930's. Three
black defendants were denied the aid of counsel when accused of
rape and faced the death penalty in Alabama. 8 Reversing their
conviction, the Court carved out a well-defined area of required
court-appointed counsel:
12. P. LEwIs & K. PEopLES, supra note 7, at 550.
13. Id. See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); D. MELLINKOBE,
THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973).
14. P. LEwis & K. PEOPLES, supra note 7, at 550.
15. Note, supra note 8, at 1030, 1055. The sixth amendment, when proposed by Madison
on July 2, 1789, passed both houses almost without debate. Id. at 1031. From that time until
1932 there were almost no cases on right to counsel. Id. For two examples ^rom this quies-
cent period see Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) and Anderson v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24
(1898).
In Holden, Justice Brown in comparing the English and American right to counsel said:
The earlier practice of the common law, which denied the benefit of witnesses to a
person accused of felony, had been abolished by statute, though as far as it de-
prived him of the assistance of counsel and compulsory process for the attendance
of his witnesses, it had not been changed in England. But to the credit of her
American colonies, let it be said that so oppressive a doctrine had never obtained
a foothold there.
169 U.S. at 386. It was not until the American public became aware of a national crime wave
in the 1920's that defendants' rights were eclipsed by a move for law and order. Note, supra
note 8, at 1031. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 109-38 (1969).
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See generally 13 B.U.L. REv. 92 (1933) (an especially good article
that traces the history of the right to counsel); 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1430 (1932); 18 IOWA L.
REV. 383 (1933); 23 J. CaiM. L.C. & P.S. 841 (1933) (a discussion of Justice Holmes' formula-
tion for defendant protection from courts influenced by mob violence as set forth in Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), and an hypothesis of why the Court decided not to follow
that formula in Powell); 8 NoRE DAME LAW. 260 (1933); 19 VA. L. REv. 293 (1933).
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See generally 24 CORNELL L.Q. 270 (1939); 24 IOWA L. REV. 170
(1938).
18. See D. CARTER, SCO'rSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE SOUTH (1979). This award winning
book contains an excellent bibliography of the popular press reaction during the time of the
trials.
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[11n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ coun-
sel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense be-
cause of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law .... 19
Moreover, the assignment of counsel must be made so as to allow
enough time to prepare for trial and to provide an effective
defense.2 0
Johnson v. Zerbst extended the right to appointed counsel to all
federal felony cases.2 1 Hence, by 1938, Powell principles required
counsel in all capital cases and Johnson required counsel in all fed-
eral felony cases. Further, the Court in Johnson determined that a
valid waiver of counsel requires proof of "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' 22 Subse-
quently, in Betts v. Brady,2 the Court refused to extend the Pow-
ell principles to the states when noncapital felonies were involved.
The Court held that the sixth amendment neither guaranteed
counsel for every offense, nor rendered inherently unjust, any trial
conducted without counsel for the defense. 4
In 1963, with only two justices of the Betts court remaining
(Black and Douglas, who both dissented in that case), Gideon v.
Wainwright3 was decided, signalling the beginning of the criminal
law revolution in sixth amendment cases. Gideon requires a state
to appoint counsel in noncapital, as well as capital felony cases.
Decided on the same day as Gideon, Douglas v. California's held
that the determination of the need for counsel did not lie with the
19. 287 U.S. at 71. The Court did not focus on the sixth amendment right to counsel, but
instead on the fact that the defendant was denied the prerequisites of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. The applicability of the sixth amendment right of counsel to
the states was first addressed by the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
20. 287 U.S. at 71.
21. 304 U.S. at 468.
22. Id. at 464.
23. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
24. Id. at 473.
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTER-
MATH 1960-1971 (1972); Grove, Gideon's Trumpet: Taps for an Antiquated System? A Pro-
posal for Kentucky, 54 Ky. L. J. 527 (1965); Hunsaker, Right to Counsel-Before and After
Gideon, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 78 (1964); Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers, 45
B.U.L. REV. 445 (1965); Norton, Gideon and the Habitual Criminal Statutes, 6 WASHBURN
L.J. 24 (1966); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965).
26. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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appellate court, but flowed from the fourteenth amendment re-
quirement of due process.
Escobedo v. Illinois2 7 left its mark on the 1963-64 term, and to-
gether with the principles of Massiah and Brewer v. Williams,28 it
embodies the fullest extension of the sixth amendment protection
prior to Henry.29 While under interrogation and in custody, Esco-
bedo was consistently denied his request for counsel. As a result of
his successful challenge of this police practice, Escobedo brought
the right to counsel out of the courtroom, and into the interroga-
tion room. The Court stated, "We hold only that when the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the
accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary
system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer."30 If Esco-
bedo extended sixth amendment protections from the courtroom to
the police interrogation room, Massiah, as discussed in the next
section, freed it from the confines of "custody" entirely.
The Warren Court, which fathered Gideon and Escobedo, had a
tremendous impact on criminal procedure from 1953 to 1969.8' The
intense public reaction to these cases led to what has been called a
conservative backlash.32 Presidents Nixon and Ford appointed a
total of five justices: Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
27. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See generally Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a
Fourteenth Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 143 (1965);
Rothblatt, Police Interrogation and the Right to Counsel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois: Appli-
cation v. Emasculation, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 41 (1965); Van Pelt, The Meaning and Scope of
Escobedo v. Illinois, 38 F.R.D. 441 (1966).
28. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). At issue in Brewer, was the knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to counsel and the meaning of interrogation. Powell's two pronged analysis, delib-
erateness and surreptitious interrogation, as enunciated in Henry, emanates from Brewer.
29. The 1966-67 term saw the Supreme Court extending the right to protection of coun-
sel into the police line-up identification rooms. This trilogy includes United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967). The Court in these cases guaranteed, "[i]n recognition of the realities of
modern criminal prosecution," that the sixth amendment guarantee applies to all critical
stages of the proceedings. CRIMINAL LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 98. "[Tlhe accused
must be guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the state at any stage of the prose-
cution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial." Id. Of particular concern to the Court was the inability to
reconstruct at the trial the potentially prejudicial manner in which the line-ups could be
conducted. Id. at 98-99.
30. 378 U.S. at 492,
31. See CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION, note 25 supra. See generally G. KURLAND, THE SU-
PREME COURT UNDER WARREN (1973); R. MEDALIE, FROM EsCOHEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANAT-
OMY OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION (1966).
32. CRIMINAL JUSTICE & THE BURGER COURT 2 (J. Galloway ed. 1978).
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Stevens.33 Their antipathy to Warren Court decisions has been
shown in the restrictive manner in which the Burger Court has in-
terpreted these cases. Though not specifically overruling the cases,
the Burger Court's restrictive policy has gradually eroded the vari-
ous rights extended during the Warren Court era.34 It is for this
reason-the generally restrictive interpretation of defendants'
rights in criminal procedure cases-that the Henry decision is so
surprising. Under the Warren Court, Henry would have been
viewed as a logical extension of Massiah; as a product of the Bur-
ger Court, it has the appearance of an abrupt turnabout from judi-
cial conservatism.
II. Massiah's GODCHILD: United States v. Henry
Massiah is the touchstone of sixth amendment right to counsel
cases in a post-indictment setting. In that case, the codefendants
had been indicted on drug related charges and had been released
on bail pending trial. Massiah's codefendant, Colson, decided to
aid the government in its continuing investigation of the crime.8
Colson planted a radio transmitter in a parked car monitored by a
nearby agent. During the course of a lengthy conversation in the
bugged car, Massiah made several incriminating statements. 6 In
applying the exclusionary remedy to Massiah's incriminating re-
marks, the Court held, "[t]he petitioner was denied the basic pro-
tections [of the sixth amendment] when there was used against
him . ..his own incriminating words, which federal agents had
deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in
the absence of his counsel. 3 7 The Court went on to emphasize the
application of sixth amendment protections to "surreptitious inter-
rogations" as well as to direct questions."
In Henry, the defendant had been indicted on charges of armed
robbery of a bank and was awaiting trial in the Norfolk County
Jail.19 Sharing his cellblock was forger cum informer Edward B.
Nichols.4 0 Acting as the human counterpart to Massiah's mechani-
33. Id.
34. See generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398 (1970). See, e.g., CRmUMAL JUSTME & THE BURGER COURT supra note 32, at 213-15.
35. 377 U.S. at 202.
36. Id. at 203.
37. Id. at 206.
38. Id.
39. 100 S. Ct. at 2184.
40. The timing of exactly who was where first seems an unresolved detail in determining
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cal "bug," Nichols, a paid government informer, ingratiated him-
self and gained Henry's confidence to the point that Henry trusted
him to aid in a planned escape. As a surprise witness at Henry's
trial, Nichols then testified to incriminating statements made by
Henry while in jail."1
Writing for a five justice majority, 42 Chief Justice Burger con-
cluded that the cellmate informer had "deliberately elicited" state-
ments from Henry.43 Though the FBI agent had specifically told
Nichols not to take any affirmative steps, the agent "must have
known that such propinquity likely would lead to that result."'44
The majority also rejected a government assertion that Henry
had waived his right to counsel by voluntarily discussing his crime
with the informer. Because Henry did not know that Nichols was a
paid informer, he cannot be said to have "knowingly and voluntar-
ily" waived his sixth amendment rights.'5 In addition, the Court
emphasized the fact that Henry was in custody. It noted that the
subtle influences of confinement make a defendant more vulnera-
how much of a "plant" Nichols was. In the respondent's brief, it is stated that both Nichols
and Sadler (whose role will be delineated later) were moved into Henry's cell. Brief of Re-
spondent at 9, United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980). The Court, in its statement of
the facts of the case, indicates that Nichols had both been serving time, and informing, prior
to Henry's incarceration. The suggestion is that Henry "came to" Nichols in both a figura-
tive and literal sense. 100 S. Ct. at 2184.
The Court further indicates that it was Nichols who informed the agent that Henry was in
his cell. Id. This would suggest the serendipitous nature of the proximity of Henry to
Nichols.
41. 100 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
42. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined the Chief Justice.
The most surprising members of this majority are Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell.
As shown in an analysis of right to counsel cases decided by the Burger Court from 1970-
1977, the Chief Justice voted to extend the sixth amendment in only two of the twelve
surveyed cases: in Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971), a per curiam decision which was
held fully retroactive, and in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). P. LEwis & K.
PEOPLES, supra note 7, at 593. See generally Froyd, Is Argersinger a Shot in the Arm or a
Coup de Grace? 62 A.B.A.J. 1154 (1976). In Argersinger, the right to counsel was extended
to all offenses punishable by imprisonment. 407 U.S. at 37.
In contrast, the votes of Marshall and Brennan in Henry are indicative of their strong
support of sixth amendment extension cases. They both voted against an extension of the
sixth amendment in only two cases, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), and Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Each of these cases concerned the right to counsel in quasi-
judicial settings. Gagnon held there was no right to have appointed counsel at probation
revocation hearings, although the Court further stated that this should be a case-by-case
determination. 411 U.S. at 787-88. Wolff held there was no right to counsel at prison disci-
plinary hearings. 418 U.S. at 570.
43. 100 S. Ct. at 2186-89.
44. Id. at 2187. The Court indicated that Nichols was paid only when he produced the
information wanted by the FBI. Id. at n.7.
45. Id. at 2188-89.
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ble to the wiles of undercover agents."'
Henry is in many ways a foursquare affirmation of the protective
arm of the sixth amendment extended by Massiah. Though Henry
was in custody and Massiah was not, they have in common the
three elements that the Henry Court found critical in determining
whether the incriminating statements had been deliberately elic-
ited by a government agent.4 v First, each was under indictment;
therefore, sixth amendment protections had attached.48 Second,
Colson and Nichols, the informers, were being paid by the govern-
ment and were therefore under the same constraints as govern-
ment agents. Third, Massiah and Henry each thought that they
were speaking to trusted co-conspirators, so there was no voluntary
and knowing waiver of rights.4'
Writing in concurrence, Justice Powell50 placed emphasis on the
deliberate nature of the government's actions. Distinguishing Mas-
siah from the hypothetical case of a totally passive informer, Pow-
ell wrote:
The rule of Massiah serves the salutary purpose of preventing
police interference with the relationship between a suspect and
his counsel once formal proceedings have been initiated. But
Massiah does not prohibit the introduction of spontaneous state-
ments that are not elicited by governmental action .... Simi-
46. Id. at 2188.
47. Id. at 2186.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
49. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).
50. Justice Powell's record on sixth amendment cases has been conservative. In only
one-third of twelve cases surveyed did he vote to extend the sixth amendment. P. LEwis &
K. PEOPLES, supra note 7, at 593. He wrote a concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972), and joined the majority in both Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975), upholding a right to self-representation at felony trials and Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853 (1975), in which the Court held that denying counsel an opportunity for closing
argument during a nonjury trial was a denial of right to counsel. Id.
Faretta has been the source of a judicial broadside and a wealth of commentary: "If there
is any truth to the old proverb that 'one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,' the
Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of
himself." 422 U.S. at 852 (Justice Blackmun with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Rehn-
quist join, dissenting) (emphasis in original). See generally Chused, Faretta and the Per-
sonal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 636
(1977); Note, Faretta v. California and the Pro Se Defense: The Constitutional Right of
Self Representation, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 897 (1976); Note, Faretta v. California: The Consti-
tutional Right to Defend Pro Se, 5 CAP. U.L. REV. 277 (1976); Note, Faretta v. California:
The Law Helps Those Who Help Themselves, 28 HAS7rNGs L.J. 283 (1976); Comment, The
Right to Appear Pro Se: Developments in the Law, 59 Ns. L. REV. 135 (1980).
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larly, the mere presence of a jailhouse informant . . . would not
necessarily be unconstitutional . ... [T]he question would be
whether the informant's actions constituted deliberate and "sur-
reptitious interrogation" . . .. 5
The Powell test, then, has two elements: deliberateness and sur-
reptitious interrogation. In Henry, the moment the government
agent told Nichols to overhear Henry's conversations, and Nichols
then engaged him in conversation, the first element, deliberate-
ness, was satisfied." The government had sought to obtain state-
ments from Henry after formal proceedings had begun without the
presence of counsel. There can be little doubt that Nichols' actions
were surreptitious; Henry thought he was speaking to a fellow con-
vict, not a paid informer. But are conversations between cellmates
interrogation? If one of them is being paid by the government to
procure information, then the conversation is interrogation."
As discussed by legal commentators, and approved by the major-
ity," however, the critical element was not interrogation at all. No
inquiry was made in Massiah as to who initiated the conversation
about the crime, Massiah or Colson." The Court's decision in
Henry indicates that once the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches, the full protection of the sixth amendment will follow a
defendant wherever and however the government may choose to
question him. In the words of Chief Judge Lumbard, restating the
arguments for Massiah's counsel, "[Massiah] could not legally be
approached by persons acting on behalf of the government in the
absence of his counsel."" As said in the Massiah dissent from the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, "federal officers must deal
through and not around an attorney retained by a defendant under
indictment. ' '5
In Henry there were actually two informers, offering a nice coun-
terpoint of forbidden active eliciting of information on one hand,
and permissible passive information gathering on the other. Nich-
ols, of course, was paid to "keep his ears open," but was told not to
51. 100 S. Ct. at 2190.
52. Id.
53. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When
Does It Matter?, 67 GEO.L.J. 1 (1978).
54. Id. at 41; 100 S. Ct. at 2186-87.
55. 100 S. Ct. at 2186-87.
56. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(emphasis added).
57. Id. at 72.
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ask any questions." Sadler, a second cellmate, told his attorney of
statements that Henry had made while in conversation with him.
His attorney suggested he inform the government of these conver-
sations. 59 The only plausible reason that counsel would suggest
such a move would be in hope of a reward for his client. To the
degree that Sadler anticipated a reward for his disclosures they
were as much elicited by the government as was the testimony of
Nichols. The government had been active in the Nichols situation,
passive with Sadler; the government approached Nichols, but Sad-
ler approached the government. The Constitution speaks to gov-
ernmental action, not action initiated by a private individual.60
Though Sadler was in some attenuated fashion motivated by the
government, this is no more a "governmental action" than when a
private citizen seeks to gain a monetary reward for locating or sup-
plying critical information on one of the "wanted" in the post of-
fice's rogues' gallery.
The Henry opinion contains a strong dissent. In an eleven page
opinion, only two and a half pages are the opinion of the majority.
Justice Powell's concurrence is less than a page in length. Justice
White joins Justice Blackmun in his dissent, and Justice Rehn-
quist writes a separate dissent.61
Justices White and Blackmun highlight six policy objections to
the Henry doctrine in their lengthy dissent. 2 The first objection is
that the sanction imposed for finding a sixth amendment viola-
58. 100 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
59. Id. at 2185 n.3.
60. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
61. Justice Blackmun, other than the per curiam decision in Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S.
847 (1971), has only once voted to extend a sixth amendment right to counsel-in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Justice Rehnquist cast his sole pro-extension vote
in a concurring opinion in that same case. Justice White dissented in Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1972), the infamous "Christian Burial Speech" case, which reaffirmed Massiah
principles (in which Justice White also dissented) and clarified the necessity for a knowing
and intelligent waiver of sixth amendment protections. In Brewer, Massiah, and Henry,
Justice White has consistently maintained that the role of counsel has been improperly ex-
tended beyond, in the words of Enker and Elsen, the "traditional function of preparing for
and participating in a trial or trial type proceeding to the representation and counseling of
persons under police investigation where they are under indictment." See Enker & Eisen,
Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L.
Rav. 47, 48 (1964-65).
62. 100 S. Ct. at 2192-93.
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tion-the exclusion of evidence-is too severe, because it prevents
probative evidence from being admitted at trial. Second, the dis-
senters assert that the Court has undermined, and has little appre-
ciation for, undercover work. Third, subjectively considered at the
time they were given, Henry's statements were entirely voluntary.
Fourth, the police action here was not egregious, and in fact dem-
onstrates an effort to comply with constitutional standards, be-
cause the informer was specifically told not to question the sus-
pect. Fifth, citing Hoifa v. United States,"' White and Blackmun
found no breach of "the canons of fairness" when the government
uses statements obtained through an informer and a "wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom be [sic] voluntarily con-
fides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Lastly, the two dissenters
decry any further extension of Massiah. They note the limiting
language of other sixth amendment cases "of providing counsel to
counterbalance prosecutorial expertise and to aid defendants faced
with complex and unfamiliar proceedings. '6 5
In the first four reasons, Justices Blackmun and White seem to
emphasize what they perceive as a trivial breach of sixth amend-
ment rights-the attempt was well intended, the suspect was not
physically coerced, and the cure much worse than the slight ill-
ness.6 6 In citing Hoffa for the conceptual underpinnings of the fifth
reason, the dissenters have, however, chosen a case easily distin-
guishable from Henry. In Hoffa, the informant elicited information
during a purely investigatory stage of the proceedings. No sixth
amendment protections attached because there were no adversarial
criminal proceedings in progress for the crime being investigated,
although Hoffa was on trial and had retained counsel for a sepa-
rate offense.6
Blackmun and White seek to distinguish between "deliberate"
interference with a suspect's right to ,counsel, and an incidental,
less culpable form of conduct." In Henry, no investigator was re-
sponsible for placing the defendant in the same cell as Nichols."'
Henry's statements were not coerced. Any trespass upon the defen-
dant's right to counsel was purely incidental.
63. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
64. 100 S. Ct. at 2192 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 385 U.S. at 308.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2193 n.6.
69. Id. at n.7.
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Yet the agent's actions, once he knew of the propinquity of his
informer and Henry, and once he told the informer he specifically
wanted information about that man and the very crime for which
he had been arrested, moved Nichols from a passive to an active
role. Thereafter, Nichols' actions must be viewed as deliberate.
The informer was paid for getting the information. The informer
was an agent of the government. 0
Would there be a question of the inadmissibility of the informa-
tion if the informer had not also been a fellow prisoner? What if
Nichols were himself an FBI agent? It is the two-step nature of the
situation which seems to be clouding the picture.
The stance of the Tennessee Supreme Court in relation to the
jailhouse undercover agent is straightforward. State v. Berry"l was
a prison-informant case that correctly anticipated the Supreme
Court's decision in Henry by several months. In Berry, the defen-
dant had been indicted and was awaiting trial, in jail, for the
bludgeon murder of his father-in-law and the attack and torture of
his mother-in-law. Defendant's counsel had been promised by the
authorities that Berry would not be interrogated. But in fact, the
promise of no interrogation of Berry without counsel being present
was made after those same authorities had already planned to
place an undercover agent (who was not a fellow prisoner acting as
an agent) in Berry's cell. In the words of the court, "To say the
least the Sheriff was somewhat less than candid about the matter,
lulling Lawyer Bowman into a false sense of security. 72 In fact,
Berry himself was lulled into a false sense of security and, while
never actually admitting to the crimes, he made incriminating
statements placing him at the scene of the crime. The Tennessee
Court ruled that irrespective of the authorities' promises, the sixth
amendment protections had already attached. 3
In Berry, the state argued that the agent had been placed in the
cell not to interrogate Berry, nor to even passively absorb any
other information about the crime. Rather, the agent was placed to
find out what, if anything, Berry was threatening to do to the pros-
ecution's main witness and investigator.7 4 Noting the meager proof
for the belief that Berry had any such plans, the court stated that
even if arguendo there had been reasonable proof of such plans,
70. Id. at 2187.
71. 592 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1980).
72. Id. at 555.
73. Id. at 561.
74. Id. at 555.
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that proof would not validate the action of the state in exploiting
the consequences of its placing a law enforcement officer in Berry's
cell: "The testimony of the agent may or may not be competent in
the context of another trial on another charge, e.g., solicitation to
commit murder or arson, but it is not admissible in this trial. '7
In a California case, People v. BowmanT decided only two days
after Escobedo, the court held that the presence of an undercover
agent who is not also a fellow prisoner is a violation of the right to
counsel once the proceedings have become accusatory. Bowman in-
volved a bugged confederate seeking information for the govern-
ment about an arson. Henry makes it clear that an undercover fel-
low prisoner is nevertheless an agent, and as an agent is restrained
by sixth amendment considerations.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent. He denounced not
only the holding in Henry, but its source, Massiah.7 It is the opin-
ion of Justice Rehnquist that Massiah and Henry have run too far
afield of the "doctrinal underpinnings" of the sixth amendment.7 8
[Tihere is no constitutional or historical support for concluding
that an accused has a right to have his attorney serve as a sort of
guru who must be present whenever an accused has an inclination
to reveal incriminating information to anyone who acts to elicit
such information at the behest of the prosecution. "
In sum, the right to counsel has enjoyed a long and burgeoning
career. From the modest beginning of a lord acting as surety for his
vassal's misdemeanor, the right has grown to protect those accused
of felonies of both capital and non-capital crimes. It has reached
from a simple recitation of the law, to the full sway of courtroom
procedure. It has anticipated the defendant in the interrogation
rooms of police stations, in the monitored cars of informers, and,
with Henry, in the jail cell. Has the sixth amendment spanned the
full reach of adversarial criminal proceedings? Where can it go
from here?
III. CONCLUSION
In Henry, the majority opinion fails to determine the status of a
75. Id. at 555-56.
76. 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ct. App. 1966).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2196-97.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2200.
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totally passive confidant placed by happenstance or artifice in close
proximity to the accused who makes no effort to engage in conver-
sation, presents the same question of admissibility of incriminating
information obtained with an inanimate electronic device. 80 As
long as the court maintains its "deliberately elicited" standard,
however, it is difficult to see how any informer who has been given
prior instructions by the government will be competent to testify
over a sixth amendment objection. Once the informer has aligned
himself with the prosecution, that alignment will trigger the "de-
liberately elicited" test.
On the other hand, the second informant's testimony in Henry
was not viewed as "deliberately elicited" suggesting that the role of
undercover agent is far from dead. The fact that Sadler first ap-
proached the government with his information, rather than the
government requesting information as it did with Nichols, is
clearly the distinguishing fact. As suggested by Justice Powell's
concurrence, it is the active role as exemplified by Nichols that is
forbidden, not the passive role as exemplified by Sadler.
Henry's effects on the courts and law enforcement officials have
already been felt. In Malone v. State,81 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida overturned the murder and robbery convictions of Charles Ma-
lone, ruling that the refusal of the trial court to suppress incrimi-
nating statements made by Malone to a cellmate informant
violated his sixth amendment right to counsel.82
The informer in Malone, who remains nameless, was a fellow
prisoner. Although it is unclear whether the informer had ever
reported before, and it is unknown whether he even gained any
benefit from this job, it is clear that two and a half weeks after
meeting Malone, the informer was asked by a detective to listen
for information on the location of the victim's body. When listen-
ing failed to provide the needed information, it was the informer
who suggested the ruse which finally won Malone's confidence. The
informer arranged to be transferred to another jail, but lead Ma-
lone to believe that the informer was being freed. Malone then told
the informer the location of the body and asked the informer to
make sure it could not be found. Ironically, though the police fol-
lowed the informer's directions, it was not until Malone's co-con-
80. Id. at 2187 n.9. See generally Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
81. 37 FLA. L.W. 448 (Sept. 25, 1980).
82. Id- at 449.
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spirator lead the police to the body that it was actually located.88
Malone, like Henry before it, satisfies both elements of the Pow-
ell test. The first element, deliberateness, can scarcely be denied in
view of the scenario proposed and acted out by the informer. The
second element, surreptitious interrogation, is found in Malone's
unwitting incriminating statements made to the informer. It is in-
teresting to note that although the jail cell ruse was the brainchild
of the informer, the informer's initial involvement resulted from
recruitment by a detective. As a government recruit, the "deliber-
ately elicited" test was triggered and in the words of the court,
"[I]t was indirect surreptitious State action which elicited Ma-
lone's incriminating statements. "84 Malone not only parallels
the facts in Henry, but reflects the struggle between protecting the
rights of the accused, and protecting the safety of the general pop-
ulation through expeditious and efficient police work. Henry may
have reaffirmed the rights of the accused, but it also hindered all
but the most circumspect investigation of a criminally accused per-
son after indictment.
Malone's murders were brutal and random. Will the police, real-
izing that their investigations will be restricted in the post-indict-
ment setting, postpone the final indictment leaving the murderer
on the street? The thought of Malone being free until police had
located his victim's body, a span of considerable time even with an
informer, creates a question whether the net result of Henry will
be increased protection for the defendant at the cost of decreased
protection from the defendant. The problem of balancing this pro-
tection equation is a computation the Court will have to deal with
on a case-by-case basis.
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